Opinion: logical rhetoric makes illogical debates

Published in the Illogician, 2026i.

Note : for the published version of this article was accidentally its first draft, what follows may slightly differ from the printed text.

Debates as logic, an introduction

When defining a logical system, amongst other things, we define axioms and inference rules. From the application of the latter to the first, we aim to prove validity of statements in that logical framework, the holy grail of that process, the true goal of that ultimate quest, being the sanctified tautology, a statement true in itself (although bound by the system, but not dependent on any other), a stable result, unquestionable. The parallel between this structure and that of an argument, taken in the sense of a discussion, could not be clearer : speakers argue for certain ideas (their axioms) to be considered, and, through applications of inference rules to that newly found common ground, both sides aim for the tautology, a statement the other cannot refuse, a conclusion going their way. Then, of course, the meat, the heart, of the debate truly is the vivid game of “attacking” and “defending” one’s axioms, done through evocation of counterexamples, meta-proofs of contradiction, so on and so forth. But why is it then that so many debaters focus on the inference rules instead ?

Indeed, a great amount of discourse, notably coming from contrarians, seems not to focus on debating statements or assertions, but proving the opponent’s inference to be wrong, ill-willed, and thereby not claiming axioms of their own, no weight to bear themselves. Instead, they simply attack the assumed stability of the opposed discourse.

I present here my (though very surface-level) understanding of that phenomenon, argue for a looser, non-formal, understanding of what a debate is and tell you why I believe such a behaviour to be dangerous to discussions as a whole.

Logic of debates, the double discourse

First of all, let us consider that formal logic parable once again. I argue this focus on structure misses the point of real debate. In a previous essay (although written in godforsaken French¹), I considered a list of characteristics any interaction must obtain for them to earn that title. Most of these criteria are irrelevant to our matter, but one of them is essential for us : debaters address a double discourse, directed towards both their opponent, explicitly, and the audience, implicitly, attempting to convince the latter. Notice how the opponent can also themselves be part of the audience, making cases of debates behind closed doors still compatible with that criterion. I have to say, however, that this partial definition is not ideal, but practical : it helps characterise what many debates end up nowadays going for. Listen to any political roundtable, for instance; for people represent parties and ideas, they are not themselves allowed to concede to adverse arguments, and thus often end up playing deaf. Therefore, the debate cannot be happening with the goal for them to change their minds. Crucially, this results in this double discourse being unbalanced, of a split nature. Same words, yet different aim for different ears. Debate between opponents is more akin to a demonstration, a sterile play, rather than an actual discussion, of which the real point is to convince the audience, whom the words will indirectly reach.

Logic in debates, inferences above all

But convincing the audience of what ? Suppose there is an election, with two parties, the “Classicalists” and the “Intuitionists”. Classicalists could either try to convince the audience of accepting its axioms or rejecting the ones Intuitionists argue for. But, there is another more insidious option : presenting the Intuitionists’ narrative, i.e. argumentation, as unreasonable, contradictory, illogical. And, to do so, Classicalists would not aim for the throat of axioms Intuitionists defend anymore. Their goal would instead be to show that the inference rules Intuitionists apply to said axioms are invalid. The double discourse crucially still obtains : the Classicalist obviously are not trying to guide Intuitionists to better talking points. Rather, they are addressing the audience, leading them to be more sceptical and making Intuitionists appear unstable. Soon, questions from the audience will follow : yes, I may agree with their premises, but how can I be sure they will derive the right conclusion from them ? What good is there in someone defending what I believe in if they do wrong with it ? Do they even truly believe what they say, it doesn’t look like they fully grasp it ?

I believe this strategy is even stronger than advocating for axioms of your own. As mentioned before, it doesn’t involve commitment to any ideas. Rather, it allows to present oneself as the great keeper of the well-order of the discussion, the repeller of all subtle fallacies and simplifications, an arbiter of sort, granting authority on the debate, even though one is still a participant. And all this can hardly be viewed in a negative light : serious debate should be kept to an utmost standard of validity. Who would want to listen to politicians who don’t even make sense ? It is then completely possible, understandable, (and, here, sadly, the parable leaks heavily into reality) to have Classicalists only attack Intuitionists’ inferences, without presenting, nor defending, their own axioms, once again messing with the balance of the debate. The scale sheltering an empty side, self-assigned the task to keep an eye over it.

Debates for debates, speaking of words

But much like in logic itself, where language and meta-language must crucially be different, axioms and inferences, one’s premises and argumentation, lie on different levels and thus cannot blend. Focusing on inference rules is forgetting they only apply to the discourse itself, whereas the axioms apply to the concrete, in our case, to actual lives. In short, debating about the validity of an argumentation is really only debating about the debate, not what the debate is about.

One of the consequences of this meta-ification of debates is that they become far remote from people who do not typically engage in verbal jousts. Debates, and a fortiori most politics, get more and more estranged from those who care about the axioms, about life. This can be clearly observed in the upbringing of political figures, more often than not trained in communication and media, rather than spontaneously defending what they take at heart. Of course, clarity and precision of discourse should not necessarily be seen as unwanted, and ensuring validity of reasoning neither, but it shouldn’t make for the entirety of one side’s position. I perfectly understand one might prefer this overzealous “seriousness” for politics, though I personally do not, for the main goal of a traditional politician is representing their people, and this clear divide, those people feeling estranged, seems to contradict that very first motive. Now might be a good time to remind ourselves that all of this was a specific case. We are still talking about how we should understand what a debate is in general. These political disputes are but one of the ugly implications of how we treat discussions as an idea.

All that being said, what possible view, or definition, of debate could help us avoid those issues ? Well, a first approach would be to focus on what participants argue for. Notably, in our previous account, there is nothing stopping us from considering a debate between two participants holding the same world view. As long as they argue and try to convince, it would still be a debate, and for they might never criticise the other’s position (as it is their own), no contradiction would blatantly appear. But this intuitively doesn’t feel like “real” debate. Our prior definition, then, cannot be complete. I believe it is thus essential to keep in mind what participants defend (even implicitly), and to require they do actually defend something, not just attack, to grow healthy debates, and, as a plus, avoid unnecessary ones, the likes of which we just mentioned. If form is what they only use, then let us use nomenclature to undermine their speech. Healthy debates, or none.

Debate and logic, an attempted conclusion

In the end, sometimes, the better definition is the simplest, the most intuitive one. Even though it might be devoid of a bullet-proof logical structure, it still is what someone might initially believe in. Can those play-like discussions really claim the title of debate ? “Language”, “being”, “progress”, “disease”, “the self”, and many more simple notions, all seemingly impossible to define, yet of which we seem to have a never-failing intuition. Why not add “debate” to that list ? And why not process them with that same intrinsic feeling ?

Rather than aiming for bullet-proof argumentation, let us speak of what resonates, of what someone might be willing to fight for.

Debate about the axioms.

Footnotes

1. The mentioned article is listed on this website as “De l’art de faire gagner les deux camps”. This footnote was obviously not present in the original article, it would have otherwise been a strange foresight. ↩